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I. “Essential” and “accidental” properties: A modern version. 
Let me begin then by introducing you to a distinction between what I will 
call a broadly “Platonic”-style and a broadly “Aristotelian”-style metaphysics. 
The guiding thread will be the notion of the essential and non-essential (acci-
dental) features of a thing. Perhaps you will find what I am here calling an “Aris-
totelian” view unfamiliar and even foreign, because there is a kind of metaphysi-
cal “common denominator” in some philosophical circles today, left-over perhaps 
from the days of “analytic” philosophical insularity, but in any case quite unlike 
what I am here calling an “Aristotelian” metaphysics. Instead it is much closer to 
what I regard as a Platonic approach. 
In analytic philosophy, there is a view called “Aristotelian essentialism” 
— by both its supporters and its opponents — that in fact has nothing to do with 
Aristotle. It may be found, for example, in the following passage from Quine’s 
Word and Object: 
Perhaps I can evoke the appropriate sense of bewilderment 
as follows. Mathematicians may conceivably be said to be neces-
sarily rational and not necessarily two-legged; and cyclists neces-
sarily two-legged and not necessarily rational. But what of an indi-
vidual who counts among his eccentricities both mathematics and 
cycling? Is this concrete individual necessarily rational and contin-
gently two-legged or vice versa? Just insofar as we are talking ref-
erentially of the object, with no special bias toward a background 
grouping of mathematicians as against cyclists of vice versa, there 
is no semblance of sense in rating some of his attributes as neces-
sary and others as contingent. Some of his attributes count as im-
portant and others as unimportant, yes; some as enduring and oth-
ers as fleeting; but none as necessary or contingent. 
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Curiously, a philosophical tradition does exist for just such 
a distinction between necessary and contingent attributes. It lives 
on in the terms ‘essence’ and ‘accident’, ‘internal relation’ and ‘ex-
ternal relation’. It is a distinction that one attributes to Aristotle 
(subject to contradiction by scholars, such being the penalty for at-
tributions to Aristotle1). But, however venerable the distinction, it 
is surely indefensible.2 
You can also find “Aristotelian essentialism” in this sense discussed in 
Quine’s “Reference and Modality,”3 and in lots of other places. 
In the passage just quoted, there are two parts. First Quine identifies a cer-
tain theory as “Aristotelian essentialism,” and then he goes on to reject it. His rea-
sons for rejecting it do not concern me here. I’m interested for now only in what 
the doctrine is. 
According to this doctrine, 
essential property = necessary property 
accidental property = contingent property
So, in this context, essential = necessary, whereas accidental = contingent. 
The kind of “necessity” involved here is a hypothetical necessity. That is, an “es-
sential property” of a thing is one such that if the thing exists at all, it has to have 
that property. Likewise, a “contingent” property of a thing is one such that if the 
thing exists, it may or may not have that property. 
The idea that this view is really Aristotle’s can be dismissed right away 
once we recall the authentically Aristotelian notion of a “necessary accident,” 
found for instance in Metaphysics V.30. It is easy to see, therefore, that Quine’s 
quick identification of the accidental with the contingent is not an altogether Aris-
totelian notion, so that it’s not surprising that he finds “scholars” contradicting 
him. 
II. The “Platonic” approach. 
In fact, Quine’s view is much more what I regard as a Platonic view of 
things. On such a view, here is what you have: First of all, you have an object, 
which has certain properties that are somehow attached to it. The nature of that 
connection will vary, depending on the particular theory. You can call it “exem-
plification,” “participation,” or whatever you want. 
                                                 
1 Anyone who says silly things like that about Aristotle deserves whatever penalty he is 
made to pay! 
2 Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object, (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 
1960), § 41, pp. 199–200. 
3 Willard Van Orman Quine, “Reference and Modality,” in his From a Logical Point of 
View: Logico-Philosophical Essays, rev. ed., (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 139–159. 
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The important point is that some of these properties are, so to speak, 
“permanently” attached to the object; they are the so called essential properties. 
Others can be removed from the object without destroying it; they are the acci-
dental properties. The distinction between these two kinds of properties is, of 
course, the feature of the doctrine Quine finds arbitrary, and therefore unjustified. 
Now it may very well be arbitrary and unjustified. But it’s plainly not in-
coherent. In fact, it’s fairly easy to picture how this goes: 
The object is a little like a “pin cushion.” The properties are so to speak 
the “pins” in the pin-cushion.4 
The accidents are so to speak the “straight” pins. They can be inserted or 
removed from the pin cushion without damaging anything. 
The essential properties are like “fish hooks.” You can’t take them out 
without ripping the whole thing open and destroying the pin cushion.5 
So much for the distinction be-
tween essential and accidental properties 
of a thing on this “Quinean/Platonic” ap-
proach. The properties are simply the pins 
in the pin cushion, attached in various 
ways to the cushion. 
The other side of the picture is of 
course the object: the pin cushion itself. 
Now watch closely. By itself, all on 
its own, the object has no properties. The 
properties are all “attached” from outside. 
By itself, the object then is a kind of “bare 
particular.” It has no internal structure, no 
features of its own whatsoever. 
Note: The terminology can be ra-
ther fluid here. You may want to call the 
whole complex the “object” — the pin 
cushion (or “core”) plus the pins or prop-
erties. Or maybe you will want to reserve 
the word ‘object’ for the core plus the permanent or essential properties. The ter-
minology in the end doesn’t matter; the point is that, however you want to distrib-
ute your terminology, the picture is the same. 
This picture is one that is represented very nicely in first-order logic — so 
it is probably no coincidence that Quine approached metaphysics in this way, 
since he was very much taken with “the logical point of view.” On this view, the 
relation between the pins and the pin cushion, between properties and objects, is 
represented quite nicely in predication: Predicates are to their subjects as proper-
ties are to their objects. 
                                                 
4 This is your introduction to “Spade’s famous pin-cushion model,” which I use a lot in 
the classroom. 




If you know Quine’s work (and if you don’t you should), you will be 
aware that he argues that we don’t really need proper names in our language, and 
that in fact in some cases it may be philosophically confusing and misleading to 
have them there. The proper name ‘Aristotle’, for instance, can be struck out of 
our language and replaced by the predicate ‘aristotelizes’ (or something like that). 
If we do that, then whenever we want to say something about Aristotle, we now 
speak about “every x such that x aristotelizes.” Obviously, we can do this with 
any proper name at all, so that proper names can be systematically eliminated 
from our language and replaced by predicates. Since we’re no doubt going to need 
predicates anyway, we can therefore economize on the number of syntactical 
types we have in our vocabulary if we systematically adopt a policy of such re-
placement.6 
What we do need, however, even if we do eliminate proper names, is indi-
vidual variables — like the ‘x’ in ‘every x such that x aristotelizes’. 
In logic, individual variables are about as “featureless” as you can get. 
They are, so to speak, the linguistic counterparts to bare particulars. An individual 
variable is the logical analogue of the metaphysical “pin cushion” that has no 
properties at all by itself — all properties are pins in the cushion, attached from 
outside. 
So the fact is, then, that first-order logic fits very nicely with this basically 
“Platonic” picture of metaphysics. That is no doubt why this picture has been such 
an “orthodox” one in analytically-minded philosophy in the second half of the 
twentieth century. 
II.1. Problems with the “Platonic” approach. 
Of course, there are obvious problems with the picture. How are these bare 
particulars, these featureless “pin cushions,” differentiated from one another?7 As 
far as their built in features go (namely, there aren’t any), one bare particular is 
exactly like another. Hence, if you push this line of thinking very hard, you might 
begin to worry about the principle of “Identity of Indiscernibles.”8 
So you see there is some pressure on this basically Platonic way of look-
ing at things toward the view that there is really only one underlying object, one 
“pin cushion.” The pressure comes from the Identity of Indiscernibles. 
                                                 
6 Obviously, this will make things more cumbersome and inefficient. But the point here is 
not to recommend such a reworking of language for practical use. Rather, the point is to uncover 
the theoretical presuppositions of what we say. 
7 This is not the epistemological question how we can tell them apart, but rather the met-
aphysical question what distinguishes them. 
8 For present purposes, think of the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (often attributed 
to Leibniz, although it’s much older than that) as holding that if x and y are exactly alike meta-
physically, then x = y. That is, things are really the same thing unless there is some feature to dis-
tinguish them. On the present, “Platonic” approach, however, all “features” are properties, at-
tached externally to what amount to bare particulars. Hence — and here’s the worry — there ap-
pears to be nothing in its internal structure to distinguish one bare particular from another. 
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On the other hand, there is also a contrary pressure, this time arising from 
the Law of Non-Contradiction — which, insofar as it is supposed to be a law 
about what properties can be possessed by the same thing at the same time, is also 
a law involving “identity.” 
The pressure in this cases arises because, if there is really only one sub-
strate underlying all properties, then that substrate, that “pin cushion,” will have 
contrary properties at the same time, since contrary properties plainly do exist in 
the world around us. Socrates is a rational human being, but Fido is an irrational 
dog. Since all properties, on this view, inhere in the same one substrate, it appears 
that the contrary properties humanity and caninity, rationality and irrationality,  
inhere in that same one substrate at the same time. How can that be? 
So this “Platonic” approach is pushed in two opposite directions at once 
by considerations having to do with the identity of the pin cushion or underlying 
object. The Identity of Indiscernibles would lead us to say there is only one such 
object. On the other hand, the Law of Non-Contradiction would lead us to say 
there are several “bare particulars” that play this role. Neither alternative solves 
the problem once and for all. Each one just moves the problem to the other side. 
II.2. The Timaeus. 
Why have I been calling this picture “Platonic”? Well, consider Timaeus 
48e–53c.9 (More or less the same view can perhaps be seen in the Seventh Letter 
342a–343c, although it is not very clear or explicit there.) 
The Timaeus is Plato’s account of the origin of the cosmos. The passage 
48e–53c contains a discussion of what he calls the “Receptacle” (= ›ðï-
äï÷Þ, hypodoché) or “receptive.” 
Now we all know that for Plato, things in the sensible world are but pale 
imitations of the “Forms” or “Ideas.” So we have two poles: (1) the Forms, and 
(2) imitations of Forms. We also know that, as early as the Parmenides, the exact 
nature of the relation between Forms and their imitations bothered Plato. The the-
ory of the Receptacle or “receptive” in the Timaeus is an attempt to work this out. 
The Receptacle is, according to the analogy developed there, like sealing 
wax, the sort of thing people used to use to seal envelopes. Often a signet ring or 
other form of seal bearing an identifying design was impressed onto the wax, 
leaving its outline there. This served as a form of authentication. If the impression 
in the wax had been tampered with, it would be pretty easy to see, and in that case 
the recipient of the letter would know that the envelope had been opened in trans-
it, and the contents probably altered. 
                                                 
9 The only text of Plato available in Latin translation during the Middle Ages was the first 
part of the Timaeus, ending with 53c — the very end of the passage I want to discuss now. It was 
translated by a certain Chalcidius in the late third or early fourth century. As an act of supereroga-
tion, he also provided a commentary. (Note: Strictly speaking, the Phaedo and the Meno were also 
translated into Latin later on in the Middle Ages. But they didn’t circulate widely. The Timaeus 
did circulate, particularly in the twelfth century.) 
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That’s the guiding metaphor here. The Receptacle is like sealing wax. The 
Forms, on the other hand, are like the seal ring itself. Just as a seal ring leaves a 
number of distinct impressions in different blobs of sealing wax, so too a Form 
leaves a number of distinct “impressions” in the Receptacle. The word translated 
‘impression’ here is ‘dêìáãåsïí’ (= ekmageion), and is in fact the Greek word 
commonly used for impressions of a seal.10 With that background, consider now 
Timaeus 50c–d: 
Now the same account, in fact, holds also for that nature which 
receives all the bodies [= the Receptacle]. We must always refer to 
it by the same term, for it does not depart from its own character in 
any way. Not only does it always receive all things, it has never in 
any way whatever taken on any characteristic similar to any of the 
things that enter it. Its nature is to be available for anything to 
make its impression upon, and it is modified, shaped and reshaped 
by the things that enter it. These are the things that make it appear 
different at different times. The things that enter and leave it are 
imitations of those things that always are [= the Forms], imprinted 
after their likeness in a marvelous way that is hard to describe. 
This is something we shall pursue at another time. For the moment, 
we need to keep in mind three types of things: that which comes to 
be [= the impression in the Receptacle], that in which it comes to 
be [= the Receptacle itself], and that after which the thing coming 
to be is modeled, and which is the source of its coming to be [= the 
Form]. It is in fact appropriate to compare the receiving thing 
[= the Receptacle] to a mother, the source [= the Form] to a father, 
and the nature between them [= the impression] to their offspring. 
We also must understand that if the imprints are to be varied, with 
all the varieties there to see, this thing upon which the imprints are 
to be formed [= the Receptacle] could not be well prepared for that 
role if it were not itself devoid of any of those characters that it is 
to receive from elsewhere. For if it resembled any of the things that 
enter it, it could not successfully copy their opposites or things of a 
totally different nature whenever it were to receive them. It would 
be showing its own face as well. This is why the thing [= the Re-
                                                 
10 Here we see for the first time the crucially important “seal ring metaphor.” It is used 
here by Plato in a cosmological context. It will be used by Aristotle in an epistemological context. 
(To this day, we still speak of being “under the impression that ”) And it will be used through-
out the Middle Ages in a variety of philosophical contexts. Plato does not actually talk about seal-
ing wax and rings here, but later authors sometimes do, and Plato’s vocabulary indicates that this 
was the root metaphor. 
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ceptacle] that is to receive in itself all the elemental kinds must be 
totally devoid of any characteristics.11 
Apart from the metaphor, note the argument in the last part of the passage. 
In order to do its job properly, sealing wax has to be pretty shapeless stuff all by 
itself. If it had a built-in shape or outline all its own, that would get in the way of 
its taking on any other shape or outline from a seal ring. It would always “be 
showing its own face as well.” Hence — note the last sentence of the quotation — 
the one underlying substrate of all impressions (in terms of the picture in Figure 1 
above, the one underlying object that bears all properties) is by itself completely 
featureless. 
Given this situation, it is perhaps not hard to see why the historical Plato 
identified his underlying substrate — the so called “Receptacle” — with space.12 
Space, after all, is pretty odd stuff. It is in a sense one thing, and yet it is made up 
of distinct parts — regions — that are effectively indistinguishable from one an-
other, insofar as we are talking about empty space. Plato’s suggestion, then, was 
not a bad try. 


















 Rather, the safest course by far is to propose that we speak about the-
se things [= the “impressions”] in the following way: what we invaria-
bly observe becoming different at different times — fire for example — 
to characterize that, i.e., fire, not as “this,” but each time as “what is 
such,” and speak of water not as “this,” but always as “what is such.” 
And never to speak of anything else as “this,” as though it had some 
stability, of all the things at which we point and use the expression 
“that” and “this” and so think we are designating something.  Rather, 
“what is such” — coming around like what it was, again and again — 
that’s the thing to call it in each and every case. So fire — and generally 
everything that has becoming — it is safest to call “what is altogether 
such.” But that in which they appear to keep coming into being and 
from which they subsequently pass out of being [= the Receptacle], 
that’s the only thing to refer to by means of the expressions “that” and 
“this.” A thing that is some “such” or other, however, — hot or white, 
say, or any one of the opposites, and all things constituted by these — 
should be called none of these things [i.e., “this” or “that”].13
                                                 
11 Donald J. Zeyl, trans., in John M. Cooper, ed., Plato: Complete Works, (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Co., 1997). The insertions in square brackets are my own commentary. 
12 Timaeus 52b.  
13 Zeyl translation again. This time the last insertion in square brackets is the translator’s; 
the others are mine. 
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Translations of this passage differ widely, because the Greek is far from 
clear. But I think we can make some headway in understanding the passage as 
follows. Consider: 
(1) The Platonic Form of “fire” (to use one of Plato’s own examples. 
(2) The Receptacle. 
(3) The product of the two,  this-worldly imitations of the Platonic Form 
of “fire” — i.e., ordinary, familiar, mundane fire. 
Now, the passage asks, should we talk about (3), ordinary, mundane fire as 
“this” or as “what is such”? Plato’s answer is that we should call it “what is such” 
(line 5). That is, I suggest, strictly speaking we should reserve the word ‘fire’ for 
(1) — the Form. What we commonly call “fire” should instead be called “fiery,” 
or something like that.14 
Why? Because what we commonly call “fire,” the familiar sort, is simply 
not stable enough to be called “this” (lines 6–8). Things in the sensible world 
around us are constantly changing into other things, after all, so that (3), the prod-
uct of (1) and (2), is simply too “iffy” to be called “this.” Whatever you may think 
of that consideration, let’s just grant it for the moment and go on. 
Is there anything, then, stable enough and having the permanence Plato 
thinks is suggested by the word ‘this’? Well yes, the Receptacle.15 At lines 14–15, 
he explicitly says the Receptacle can rightly be called “this.” 
So what happens when we try to describe (3), ordinary, this-worldly 
“fire”? We have to say something like “This is fiery.” But notice: Despite what 
we might think at first, the ‘this’ here does not indicate (3) itself, which is what 
we thought we were talking about. We’ve just seen Plato say that (3), ordinary, 
mundane “fire” is not “this.” Instead, the ‘this’ indicates the Receptacle! 
When we say ‘This is fiery’, therefore, the predicate ‘fiery’ describes what 
kind of impression is pressed into the Receptacle (the sealing wax in the seal ring 
model) — the impression produced by the Platonic Form of fire (the seal ring). 
Well, that’s all very obscure, to be sure, and the details are not terribly im-
portant for us. But do look over the passage in the quotation, and my remarks on 
it, because I think we can see something happening. Watch closely. 
II.3. Matter. 
Later on in the Platonic tradition, talk about the Receptacle came to be in-
terpreted as talk about matter.16 With that in mind, I think we can see in this pas-
                                                 
14 I’m extrapolating, to be sure. Plato doesn’t actually say anything here about how we 
should use the term ‘fire’. But note that his examples of “such”-words (line 15) are ‘hot’ and 
‘white’ — adjectives and not nouns. In short, I am taking the expression ‘what is such’ as a kind 
of variable expression, to be replaced by adjectival expressions like ‘fiery’ or ‘watery’. 
15 One might also think the Platonic Form of fire would surely have the required perma-
nence. But Plato says the Receptacle is the only thing that can be called “this” (lines 14–15). 
16 More about this in a moment. 
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sage the roots of a traditional mediaeval theory: the theory that in discourse about 
the world around us, the distinction between subject and predicate matches the 
distinction between matter and form.17 Hence, we have the origins of the doctrine 
of matter as the subject of predication. 
This perhaps explains why Plato goes on to say that the Receptacle is 
“perplexing” and “extremely difficult to comprehend” (51b), that it can be “appre-
hended” only by a kind of “bastard reasoning” (52b). There is something after all 
ineffable about matter (the Receptacle) all by itself. Anything you might want to 
say about it would involve a Form or an impression in matter — something be-
sides the matter all by itself. Hence when we try to talk about the Receptacle, or 
empty space, or pure matter, all by itself, we get one of those awkward situations 
where we’re trying to say what cannot be said. 
Now, what about the identification of the Receptacle with matter? Well 
Plato, as we know, didn’t make that identification (and in fact he identified it with 
space instead), but Chalcidius did, not in his translation of the Timaeus but in his 
commentary on it.18 
Chalcidius’s term for matter is ‘silva’, which literally means “wood,” and 
is an excruciatingly literal translation of the Greek œëç (= hyle, pronounced “HOO-
lay”), which also strictly means “wood” but, curiously, in philosophical usage 
came to mean matter.19 This use of ‘silva’ to mean “matter” in Latin philosophical 
texts is almost always evidence of the influence — and the fairly immediate influ-
ence — of Chalcidius.20 
Chalcidius also has a term for the impressions left by the seal ring. He 
calls them “native forms” (formae nativae) — i.e., inborn forms. This expression 
will also be used later in the Middle Ages, for example by certain figures in the so 
called School of Chartres in the twelfth century. Sometimes the expression ‘im-
pressed form’ was also used for the same notion. 
                                                 
17 Or matter and impression in the matter, depending on how one wants to develop the 
theory. Note that while this was a “traditional mediaeval theory,” it was by no means universally 
accepted. We’ll see a competing theory later on. 
18 On Chalcidius, see n. 9 above. 
19 This was the word Aristotle used. Note that this may be simply a result of starting with 
a different metaphor. Instead of viewing physical objects as the result of stamping impressions 
into something like sealing wax, and therefore as a case of adding something to matter, think of 
them as the result of “whittling away” (and therefore “subtracting”) from something like a block 
of wood. While we’re talking about words for matter, it’s probably worth noting that the English 
word comes from Latin ‘materia’ = “matter,” which is etymologically related to Latin ‘mater’ = 
“mother” (they are derived from the same Indo-European root). And while Plato does not call his 
Receptacle by the same name Aristotle used for matter, he does explicitly compare it to a mother. 
(See the passage quoted above from Timaeus 50c–d.) 
20 See J. Reginald O’Donnell, “The Meaning of ‘Silva’ in the Commentary on the 
Timaeus of Plato by Chalcidius,” Mediaeval Studies 7 (1945), pp. 1–20. If you are interested in 
pursuing the — well, in pursuing this “matter,” you might also want to look at J. C. M. Van 
Winden, Calcidius on Matter: His Doctrine and Sources. A Chapter in the History of Platonism, 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959). Note: ‘Calcidius’ is an alternative spelling. 
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II.3.i. Boethius. 
Boethius, De trinitate, § 2, has what is in effect the same doctrine. Here’s 






















For every being is from form. For a “statue” is not so called be-
cause of the bronze that is its matter, but because of the form by which 
the likeness of an animal is impressed on the bronze. [And] the “bronze” 
itself is so called not because of earth, which is its matter, but because 
of the configuration of bronze. “Earth” itself is also so called not be-
cause of Tðïéïí œëçí,22 but because of the dryness and heaviness, 
which are forms. Thus nothing is said to be because of matter, but be-
cause of its proper form. 
But the divine substance is a form without matter, and therefore 
one 
 Neither can it be a subject. For it is a form, and forms cannot 
be subjects. When another form, like humanity, is a subject for acci-
dents, it does not take on accidents insofar as it is, but insofar as matter 
is subjected to it. For, as long as matter, subject to humanity, takes on 
any accident, humanity itself appears to take it on. But a form that is 
without matter cannot be a subject, and cannot be in matter. For it would 
not be a form but an “image.” From the forms that are outside matter 
come the forms that are in matter and make a body. We misuse the oth-
ers, which are in bodies, when we call them “forms” while they are im-
ages. For they are made like those that are not constituted in matter. 
At the end of this passage (lines 15–20), Boethius distinguishes what he 
calls “forms” from what he calls “images.” Images are imitations of the Platonic 
Forms, in effect the impressions of the signet ring in the sealing wax, what 
Chalcidius called “native forms.” Boethius reserves the term ‘form’ for the Pla-
tonic Forms. But of course Boethius is a Christian, and so does not believe in the 
Platonic Forms in exactly Plato’s original sense. (Platonic Forms are changeless 
and uncreated. This conflicts with the Christian doctrine of creation, according to 
which everything besides God is produced — created — by God.23) He therefore 
“fixes” the theory a bit. For Boethius, God alone is a pure “form.” But God has 
thoughts, and these thoughts are the paradigms or patterns according to which 
God fashioned the world. They play the role of Platonic Forms. In short, for Boe-
thius the Platonic Forms have been moved into the mind of God, where they be-
come “divine ideas.” 
                                                 
21 From Boethius, De trinitate, II.21–56, in Boethius, The Theological Tractates, H. F. 
Stewart and E. K. Rand, ed., (“The Loeb Classical Library”; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universi-
ty Press, 1968). My translation. 
22 Tðïéïí œëçí = “unqualified matter.” 
23 On the implications of the doctrine, see my A Survey of Mediaeval Philosophy, Version 
2.0 (August 29, 1985), Vol. 1, Chap. 4. 
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This doctrine of “divine ideas” was by no means a novel view. It was al-
ready present in St. Augustine, in Plotinus, and in Philo of Alexandria (= Philo the 
Jew), who lived c. 20 BCE–40 CE. Indeed, it was the “standard” view throughout 
the entire Middle Ages.24 Incidentally, the term ‘idea’ in the Middle Ages always 
means a divine idea; it never means just any old concept in my mind or yours. 
That is a later usage. 
If God (together with his ideas) is the only pure “form,” then — following 
out the seal ring analogy — everything besides God must be either (a) matter, or 
else (b) the product of matter together with one of the “native forms” or impres-
sions that Boethius calls “images.” In short: Everything besides God has matter. 
This doctrine is accordingly called universal hylomorphism (= universal 
“matter/form-ism”). The term ‘universal’ in this phrase has nothing directly to do 
with the “problem of universals,” but simply means “applicable in all cases (ex-
cept God, of course, who is special).” 
Also, at the end of our passage (lines 11–15), Boethius remarks that 
“forms” (= divine ideas) are not the substrates (“subjects”) for accidents. Rather, 
matter is the real substrate for accidents. 
For example, if a person is tall, it is not the Platonic form humanity that 
takes on the accident of being tall. It is not even, strictly speaking, the “image” 
that takes it on. Rather, Boethius says, it is the matter that does this. Here again, 
then, we have something like the picture we arrived at in our discussion of the 
Timaeus: Matter is the subject of predication. 
Note another important consequence of this view: There are no second-
order properties. Properties do not in turn have properties of their own. Impres-
sions are not the substrates of further impressions. The pins in the pin cushion do 
not have yet other pins sticking in them. No, matter (= the Receptacle, the sealing 
wax, space) is what receives all the pins. 
For any creature, therefore, what we have is, as it were, a lump of sealing 
wax on which several rings have left their impressions at once. If you really insist, 
you can in a sense say it is the earlier impressions that take on later ones. So talk 
about “second order properties” is not entirely senseless. But it’s also easy to see 
that what is really going is that it is matter that underlies them all. 
The complete creature, then, is of a kind of “laminated” structure, consist-
ing of matter on which a whole series of forms have been impressed. This doc-
trine has a name too. It is called the Plurality of Forms. 
II.4. The binarium famosissimum. 
The doctrine of plurality of forms is a correlative of universal 
hylomorphism. Historically, the two theories are almost always found together. 
                                                 
24 This of course does not mean that everyone accepted it. William of Ockham, for in-
stance, did not. For more on the theory of divine ideas, see my Survey, Vol. 1, Chap. 19. 
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So true is this that the two are now sometimes called the binarium famosissimum 
(= the “most famous pair”).25 
Although both doctrines were more or less in circulation in the early Mid-
dle Ages (we have just seen them in Boethius), they became more systematic and 
explicit later on. They are particularly prominent, for instance, in Solomon Ibn 
Gabirol (c. 1022–c. 1051 or 1070). Ibn Gabirol was a Jewish philosopher who 
wrote an important book translated into Latin under the title Fons vitae (= Foun-
tain of Life) by the translating team of Dominic Gundissalinus (= Gonzales) and 
John of Spain in twelfth century Spain. Because he wrote in Arabic, he was often 
taken to be a Muslim, although some people thought he was a Christian. Mediae-
val Latins also weren’t too sure about his name, which got transliterated into Latin 
(really just “approximated”) as: Avencibron, Avencibrol, or other variants. In 
short, they weren’t very sure just who this man was. 
In the thirteenth century, the binarium was maintained by St. Bonaventure 
(1221–1274), the famous and profound general of the Franciscan order. Largely 
through him, the doctrine came to be associated with the Franciscan/Augustinian 
tradition in general. 
Let’s elaborate the binarium a bit more, and go over the reasoning one 
more time. 
If you take the point of view that matter is the subject of predication, then 
anything you can talk about, anything you can predicate something of, is going to 
have matter, and so be a “composite” of matter and form (in Boethian terms, mat-
ter plus an “image” — I’m no longer talking about Platonic forms). 
This composite structure, this possessing of matter, therefore, was regard-
ed as a mark of a creature. It was what (among other things) distinguished all 
creatures from God, who alone is absolutely simple and incomposite. Even an-
gels, on this theory, had a kind of matter — called “spiritual matter.” The expres-
sion ‘spiritual matter’ may at first sound like an oxymoron, but it isn’t. On this 
view, matter comes in two varieties: corporeal matter and spiritual matter. Corpo-
real matter is the familiar kind. To be sure, angels don’t have anything like that. 
But even they have a “spiritual” matter that is what makes them composite and 
provides a subject of predication. Only God has no matter at all. This is what Boe-
thius is talking about when he says (lines 11–12) that “form” without matter can-
not be a substrate. He’s talking about God. 
It is also why, on this basically “Platonic” approach, God is so hard to talk 
about, why we have to resort to metaphor and circumlocution at best. It is because 
                                                 
25 I used to think this was a mediaeval label for this pair of doctrines. But Professor 
Christopher J. Martin, of the University of Auckland, has convinced me this isn’t so. Although the 
expression was indeed used in the Middle Ages, it was apparently not used for this particular pair 
of doctrines at all, but for something altogether different. In fact, it’s use as a name for this pair of 
metaphysical theories is a relatively recent development. I was by no means the first to use it in 
this new way, but I fear I am at least partly to blame for popularizing the usage (if “popularize” is 
the right word). In any case, the expression is too useful to give up, and so I will continue to use it 
in its new sense, to mean the regular pairing of the theories of universal hylomorphism and plurali-
ty of forms. 
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God has no matter, so that there is no subject of predication there. There is no 
subject of predication, not in the sense that God doesn’t exist so that there’s noth-
ing to talk about, but in the sense that we can’t predicate anything of him. He just 
doesn’t fit into subject position! 
Recall that Plato himself had something similar about the Receptacle. It 
was “perplexing” and “extremely difficult to comprehend” (Timaeus 51b), and can 
be “apprehended” only by a kind of “bastard reasoning” (52b). But that was for 
the opposite reason. In the case of God, there are lots of things we might want to 
say about him, but there is no subject matter we can predicate them of. In the case 
of matter (or the Receptacle), there is a subject of predication, all right, but there 
just aren’t any predicates we can predicate of it.26 
This then is how we get the doctrine of universal hylomorphism out of the 
basically “Platonic” picture of matter as the subject of predication. The other half 
of the binarium, the plurality of forms, is just the correlate of this. If matter is the 
subject of predication, forms (= Boethian “images”) are the predicates of predica-
tion. And just as you can say many things about any given object, so too it has 
many forms. 
Some of those forms are going to be “included” in others, in an appropri-
ate sense. For example, you can say of Socrates that he is a human being, and so 
has the form humanity. But you can also predicate of him the more general predi-
cate ‘animal’, and so he has the more general form animality. And so on. Ulti-
mately, you come to the form corporeity — the form that makes Socrates a physi-
cal body — as the last form before you get to bare matter.27 
So you get, once again, a kind of laminated picture, of so to speak “con-
centric” forms. And this is the picture people generally have in mind when they 
talk about the “plurality of forms.” That is, it’s not just the view that things can 
have more than one form at once. Lots of people who wanted nothing to do with 
the binarium would nevertheless cheerfully say that much. Rather, the expression 
‘plurality of forms’ usually refers to special picture of laminated or “concentric” 
forms. 
III. The “Aristotelian” approach. 
Now, after wading through all that, I hope you won’t be discouraged to 
learn that the Aristotelian tradition rejects this entire picture. We have to start 
over. 
                                                 
26 Be careful. In a sense, any predicate can be predicated of matter. That’s the only thing 
they can be predicated of on this theory. What we are talking about now is matter just by itself. 
There is nothing we can say to describe matter considered apart from the impressed forms or im-
ages, the pin cushion considered all by itself apart from the pins in it. There’s a long story to be 
told here, but I’m not going to do it now. 
27 As a good rule of thumb, whenever you see an author talking about the “form of corpo-
reity,” you can be pretty sure you are dealing with the doctrine of plurality of forms and are in a 
basically Platonic framework. 
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Consider, for example, Thomas Aquinas. In his question On Spiritual 
Creatures,28 he asks in Article 1: “Whether a spiritual substance [= an angel or 
Aristotelian separated substance, or else a human soul] is composed of matter and 
form.” His answer is: No. In short, he rejects universal hylomorphism. 
The article is written in the classic quaestio-format, with preliminary ar-
guments pro and con, the author’s (in this case, Aquinas’s) own resolution of the 
issue, and finally replies to the losing preliminary arguments. If you go look at 
some of the preliminary arguments in this first article, you’ll find many of them 
that bring out the themes we have just been discussing. For example, preliminary 
objections 1, 2, 4, 13, 14, etc. In objection 1, the argument is taken from Boethi-
us’s De trinitate, the very passage we’ve just looked at. 
In Article 3 of the same work, Aquinas asks: “Is the spiritual substance 
that is the human soul united to the body through a medium?” Now you may not 
recognize it from that, but in fact what Aquinas is asking here is whether there is 
some intervening form. Again, his answer is: No. In short, he denies the doctrine 
of plurality of forms too.29 The same thing is also at stake in his Summa 
theologiae, I q. 76. 
So Aquinas’s view — and the view of the Aristotelian tradition in general 
— is going to be different. In order to see what is involved, let’s go back and 
change the picture we drew at the very beginning. 
In the Platonic tradition we 
have been discussing up to now, the 
core object was a bare particular. 
Whether there was one or many of 
them was a sticky question, but in any 
case that core object: 
(a) had no internal structure of 
its own, and 
(b) had no internal features of 
its own either. (The “features” were 
the pins in the cushion.) 
What’s the difference between 
an internal “structure” and internal 
“features”? Well, the terminological 
distinction is entirely my own, and 
perhaps it’s a bit artificial, but I need 
to draw attention to the point some 
way. As I am now using these terms, (a) and (b) are not the same claim at all. 
Sometimes people think they are (whatever terminology they use), and that a 
                                                 
28 Thomas Aquinas, On Spiritual Creatures (De Spiritualibus Creaturis), Mary C. 
FitzPatrick, trans., (“Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation,” Vol. 5; Milwaukee, Wis.; 
Marquette University Press, 1949). 




thing cannot have any internal “features” of its own that distinguish it from other 
things unless it also has some kind of internal “structure” — internal parts. That 
may well be true, but if it is, it is not at all obvious on the face of it, and will take 
some arguing. 
Ad (a): To say a thing has an internal “structure” (in my present sense) is 
to say it has metaphysical parts that are somehow distinct from one another in a 
way that does not depend solely on our point of view, our manner of talking about 
it. In short, it is to say the thing is metaphysically complex. 
Ad (b): To say a thing has internal “features” of its own (in my present 
sense) is only to say we can describe it, we can predicate predicates of it, in a way 
that will serve distinguish it from other things that would be described differently. 
(I am not concerned here with the epistemological question how we might come 
to know which descriptions truly apply to which things.) 
Now it probably is true that having an internal “structure” in my sense im-
plies having “features.” That is, if a thing has a structure, is metaphysically com-
plex and made up of parts, then it can be described in terms of those parts; some-
thing can be about it that will distinguish it from other things, with a different 
structure. But to think that a thing’s having internal “features” in my sense implies 
its having an internal structure, its having metaphysical parts, seems to be to pre-
suppose exactly the kind of Platonic close link we have been discussing, between 
predication and metaphysics, a link such that the distinction between subject and 
predicate, and for that matter the distinctions among the predicates, are mirrored 
exactly by metaphysical distinctions in what you are talking about. In short, the 
Platonic picture we have been building up to now assumes that language is a reli-
able guide to metaphysics. That’s a big claim. Is it right? 
Aquinas, as we have seen, and before him Aristotle, are going to reject the 
Platonic framework, and with it they are going to reject the Platonic view of pred-
ication that would prevent a thing from having internal “features” of its own (and 
so being distinguishable from other things) unless it has an internal structure of its 
own too. In fact the Aristotelian tradition is going to claim, for reasons that will 
become clear later, that the “core object” does have features of its own. There will 
be things you can truly say about an object that will not be reflected on the part of 
reality by any “pins in the pin cushion.” 
So the whole picture has to be renegotiated from the very beginning. Pred-
ication can no longer be viewed as reflecting the “attachment” of things to what 
you are talking about. Note, incidentally, that on this view the problem about 
whether you have just one “core object” or many disappears.30 There is no reason 
not to have lots of such core objects. They can be distinguished from one another 
by their own internal features, so that there is no problem with the Identity of 
Indiscernibles. 
A moment ago, I distinguished the question whether a thing has internal 
features of its own (can be described) from the question whether it has an internal 
structure of its own (has metaphysical parts). For the Aristotelian tradition, the 
                                                 




core objects or “pin cushions” do have internal features of their own, as we have 
seen. Do they also have an internal structure? That is, are they metaphysical com-
posites of parts? Answer: Some are and some aren’t. 
For Aristotle, the ones that aren’t are the so called “separated substances,” 
the movers of the celestial spheres. For Aquinas, they are angels and human souls 
(both of which he likewise calls “separated substances”). God is, as always, a spe-
cial case. 
Those that do have an internal structure are, for both Aristotle and Aqui-
nas, the physical objects in the world around us. Such objects are said to be com-
posites of matter and form. In Aquinas, at any rate, they are composites of what 
he calls prime matter and substantial form.31 Together, matter and substantial 
form constitute the physical substance. 
So, just as those who accept the 
binarium famosissimum believe in two 
kinds of matter (corporeal matter and spir-
itual matter), the Aristotelians likewise have 
two kinds of substances, physical substanc-
es and “separated substances” — so called 
because they are separated from matter en-
tirely.32 Physical substances are composites 
of matter and form. Separated substances 
consist of substantial forms only — no mat-
ter. Our “pin cushion” picture now looks 
different than it did: 
The pin cushions by themselves 
(that is, apart from the pins sticking in 
them) are no longer “bare particulars,” the 
featureless somethings of the Platonic theo-
ry. They have features, they can be de-
scribed, and so can be distinguished from 
one another. Some of them even have an internal structure — parts.33 
Now let’s bring all this back to the question that got the whole thing start-
ed: essential properties and accidental properties. The features of a thing that are 
                                                 
31 This may or may not be so in Aristotle. He certainly did have a notion of substantial 
form. But there is some controversy over whether he had the notion of what the Middle Ages 
called prime matter. I’m no expert on Aristotle, but my understanding is that the present consensus 
is that he did not have that notion. 
32 The Aristotelian tradition does not accept the notion of spiritual matter. 
33 But you have to be careful here. Sometimes the word ‘from’ is used in a more restrict-
ed sense, to mean the substantial form of a physical substance only. See, e.g., Aquinas, Summa 
theologiae I, q. 76, a. 1, obj. 2. (Don’t worry about cryptic references like this. They’re simply 
included in case you want to track things down in the future.) Also, I should perhaps take this op-
portunity to warn you that, although I’ve talked about Aristotle and Aquinas, and about the broad 
Aristotelian “tradition,” that tradition was by no means a monolithic, homogenized one; people 
disagreed on details, sometimes on quite important details.  Here I’m simply drawing a sketch in 
broad strokes, for the sake of getting you oriented. You can refine things later. 
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involved in its substantial form are the “essential” features of the thing, according 
to the Aristotelian terminology. In a human being, for example, the substantial 
form involves rationality34; so we say rationality is “essential” to a human being. 
Likewise the substantial form involves animality; so we say animality is “essen-
tial” to the human being.35 
Thus the essential features of a substance are the features of the “pin cush-
ion” — the ones it has on its own. Everything else — everything that is “attached” 
as something extra, the “pins” — are what are called “accidents.” Some of them 
may be permanently and necessarily attached, given that the substance exists at 
all, some not. That makes no difference. They are all still “accidents.” 
In short, the distinction between the essential and the accidental for the 
Aristotelian tradition is not the distinction between the necessary and the contin-
gent, but rather the distinction between the internally and the externally attached, 
the pin cushion and its pins. 
In fact, we have to be careful of our vocabulary. There really is no good 
term in the Aristotelian lexicon to cover all the things we typically mean by 
‘property’ nowadays. That’s because our modern philosophical vocabulary is se-
cretly Platonic in outlook. ‘Property’ in modern parlance includes both the essen-
tial and the accidental features of a thing. But there is no one word in the Aristote-
lian tradition that includes both these things without dangerously wrong connota-
tions. The word ‘property’ itself (= proprium) is one of the five Porphyrian 
“predicables,” and so is not general enough. ‘Predicable’ is not bad. It at least co-
vers all the right things, but it has connotations from mediaeval logical theory that 
are inappropriate here. ‘Attribute’ may work too. But that is frequently used to 
translate the Latin ‘passio’, which is just another term for “proprium.” ‘Accident’ 
covers only some of the cases we want. ‘Quality’ is even worse, since according 
to the Categories, quality is just one of nine kinds of accident. 
As a result, I have used the neutral term ‘characteristic’ or ‘feature’ here, 
which really has no Aristotelian counterpart. 
III.1. Change. 
Now why do you suppose the Aristotelians held the views they did about 
substances? Why did they think substances (the pin cushions) have internal fea-
tures of their own, and why did they go even further and say that some substanc-
es, at any rate, also have a real internal structure of matter and form? 
Well, with respect to the first point, you — speaking now for the Aristote-
lian — might argue like this: Look, this is the only way out of the problem of 
“one or many” we had on the Platonic view earlier. (Was there one core object or 
several?) This is the only way to avoid violating the Law of Non-Contradiction 
without running afoul of the Identity of Indiscernibles. We have many cores or pin 
                                                 
34 “Man is a rational animal,” remember, although my experience does not confirm it. 
35 I’ve been deliberately vague here, and put this in terms of the substantial form’s “in-
volving” this or that. That’s all I want to say about it for now. 
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cushions, but they are all distinguishable from one another in virtue of their inter-
nal features. 
That’s perhaps a powerful consideration, as far as it goes. But still, why 
postulate a composition of matter and form in at least some substances? In other 
words, if you are going to reject the theory that completely indeterminate, feature-
less matter is the subject of predication in every case, why do you need to retain 
the notion of matter at all in some cases? Plainly, matter is going to have to play a 
different role in the Aristotelian tradition than it did in the Platonic tradition. And 
in fact, the Aristotelians argue, we need matter in order to account for certain 
kinds of change. 
We are now shifting gears to a quite new topic. Previously, we talked 
mainly about predication. That is still in the background, but now I want to talk 
about change. 
III.1.i. A philosophical myth. 
Let be begin by telling you a myth about the history of philosophy. It’s a 
common myth, and — like most good myths — there is a lot of truth in it. Here it 
is: 
Once upon a time, long ago, the main philosophical problem was how to 
do justice to both Parmenides and Heraclitus. Parmenides, according to the story, 
had held that the senses are untrustworthy, that the dictates of reason must be fol-
lowed, and that reason dictated, among other things, that reality is undifferentiated 
and static. There is no change. 
Heraclitus, on the other hand, had held that one must accept the testimony 
of the senses, since they are all we have to go on, and that the senses tell us that 
reality is constant and chaotic change and flux. There is no stability. 
Plato, the myth continues, solved this problem by adopting both views: 
each was true of a different realm. The visible world of Becoming, the familiar 
world we live in, is indeed a world of constant and chaotic change. There is no 
stability to be found there. But, in addition to this world, there is also another 
realm, a world of Being populated by the eternal and changeless Forms or Ideas. 
Aristotle, on the other hand, solved the problem differently. According to 
the story, Aristotle thought that while it is true that the world around us is in con-
stant flux, there are nevertheless limits to that flux and change. The change is not 
just chaotic; it is ordered. If I plant an acorn, I will get, under favorable condi-
tions, get an oak tree by a process of growth and constant change. But I won’t get 
a cow or a rhubarb plant, much less a diamond or an iceberg. In short, there are 
limits to the constant change in the world. These limits, whatever they are, are tied 
up with the “natures” of things, and this notion of “nature” is in turn tied up with 
the notion of essence in ways that will take some working out. 
So, the story goes, Aristotle in effect brought the Platonic Forms down out 
of their separated heaven, and implanted them in the interior structures of things 
here in the visible, sensible world; they become substantial forms. 
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That is the myth, nice and neat. The story then is that while Plato gives us 
only a kind of juxtaposition of Parmenides and Heraclitus, each in his own realm, 
Aristotle presents us with a real compromise. Each side must give up something: 
(a) Heraclitus gets his constant change. But it is not chaotic 
change. There is pattern to it. 
(b) Parmenides gets his stability and firmness, in the “natures” 
of things. But there is still room for constant change. 
Now, this story will provide a motive for introducing “features” or “char-
acteristics” into what we previously thought of as bare particulars. Such features 
will be the essential features of a thing, and pertain to its very core, the pin cush-
ion. They account for Aristotelian natures. 
What then is wrong with the myth? Well, you ought to be able to tell there 
is something wrong, at least with what it says about Aristotle, because if this were 
all there is to the story, then there would be no reason to introduce structure into 
the cores, no reason for a composition of form and matter. In short, if the consid-
erations raised so far are all Aristotle is concerned with, then why bring matter 
into the picture at all? 
Suppose you had these Aristotelian substantial forms without matter. (That 
is, suppose you have Aristotelian “separated substances.”) You could still have 
change — at least nothing we’ve said so far prevents it. It would be change with 
respect to the accidents. Some accidents would be permanently attached to their 
pin cushions. Which ones they are would presumably be determined in some way 
by the substantial forms. But the other accidents could come and go. There could 
well be change, then. But there would be limits to it, based on the natures or es-
sences of things. Why then bring matter into the picture? 
This suggests that something is not quite right with our myth. And that’s 
so. The myth makes the Aristotelian “compromise” between Parmenides and Her-
aclitus look altogether too neat. On the contrary, in actual fact, Heraclitus comes 
off far better than Parmenides does in the Aristotelian theory. Parmenides has to 
give up more. And this what is not reflected adequately in the myth. 
According to the myth, the essential features of a thing are fixed and not 
subject to change. If any change does occur, it will be a case of the shifting of ac-
cidents. And in fact Aristotle does allow for accidental change. He even provides 
a kind of “catalogue” of the kinds of accidental change, of what he calls “mo-
tion”: 
 Change of quantity = augmentation (growth) or diminution 
(shrinking). 
 Change of quality = alteration. 
 Change of place = locomotion. 
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(We generally reserve the word ‘motion’ for the last kind.) See Aristotle, Physics 
V.1–2, repeated in abbreviated form in Metaphysics XI.11–12. (Note: Here’s an 
interesting question for you: Aristotle allows nine categories of accidents in the 
Categories — although in Physics V he lists only seven. Why then are there not 
nine — or at least seven — kinds of accidental change instead of only three?) 
But in addition to the above three kinds of accidental change that Aristotle 
calls “motion,” he also has a fourth kind of change that cannot be accounted for 
on the sketch we’ve just given in our myth: 
 Change of substance = generation or corruption. 
See Physics V.1 and Metaphysics XI. In fact, Aristotle wrote a whole book on this 
kind of “substantial” change, the De generatione et corruptione. 
In short, for Aristotle, the pin cushions can change too! 
The mythological picture we have sketched so far is therefore not radical 
enough for what Aristotle actually did. When he says there are “limits” to change, 
all that really means is that there are limits to accidental change. That is, there are 
limits to how much a thing can change and still be the same thing. Those limits 
are accounted for by the substantial form of the thing. 
On the other hand, with respect to change here in the visible, sensible 
word (the separated substances are another case altogether), there are no limits to 
substantial change. The four so called “elements” — earth, air, fire and water — 
are constantly changing into one another, and they are the ingredients of all other 
physical objects (the so called “mixed” bodies). Thus, any kind of physical thing 
can change into any other kind of physical thing whatsoever. 
Here then is the picture: If, at the end of a change, you are left with the 
same object you started with — it’s changed in some respects, of course, but it’s 
still identically the same thing — then what we have is an accidental change, and 
the thing that endures through the change is called a “substance.” But if the 
change results either in the production of an entirely new individual that wasn’t 
there before or in the destruction of an individual that was there before, then we 
have substantial change: generation or corruption. 
Of course, this distinction depends crucially on the notion of a thing’s re-
taining or losing its identity. Just how does that work? Well, that is an excellent 
question, but let’s not demand an answer to it just yet. For the present, let’s just 
take it that this is what is meant to be the distinction between substantial and acci-
dental change, and let’s move on. 
In any change, either substantial or accidental, you need two factors: 
(a) something that differs, and 
(b) something that stays the same. 
If there were nothing at all different at the end of the change, nothing dif-
ferent from what we had at the beginning, then no change would have taken 
place; everything would be just as it was. Hence the need for (a). On the other 
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hand, if there were nothing that stayed the same and endured throughout the 
change, we would not have “change”; we would have mere succession. For ex-
ample, if I die and you are born, we would not say I have become or changed into 
you. We would have a mere succession here: first me, and then not me but you 
instead. But we would say I had become or changed into you provided we believe 
in something like the transmigration of souls — or in general, provided there is 
something that stays the same and endures, something that is first me and later on 
you. Hence the need for (b). 
In the case of accidental change, the factor that stays the same is obvious. 
It is the substance, the individual object, the pin cushion. The whole idea of acci-
dental change is that it is the kind of change that can take place while the underly-
ing object remains the same thing. 
What then is the enduring ingredient in a substantial change? We need 
one, in order to have genuine change and not mere succession. But this enduring 
factor cannot be a fully constituted individual in its own right, because then we 
would have accidental change all over again, not substantial change. This under-
lying, enduring factor, whatever it is, is going to be what the Aristotelians call 
“matter.” 
On the Platonic theory we sketched earlier, matter was the subject of pred-
ication. Here matter is introduced for a different purpose: as the underlying, en-
during substrate of substantial change. For the Aristotelian pedigree of this theory, 
see De generatione et corruptione I.4 319b31–320a8. 
There are two observations to make at this point: 
(a) This approach means that Aristotelian separated substances 
(Aquinas’s angels) do not undergo substantial change; they 
are immaterial, after all. 
(b) Aquinas and many other mediaeval Aristotelians will talk 
about “prime matter” — a kind of ultimate substrate that 
underlies all form in the visible world and that has no form 
whatsoever all by itself. (To this extent, it is like the notion 
of matter we saw earlier, in the Platonic tradition.) On the 
other hand, it is not so clear whether Aristotle himself ever 
had this notion of prime matter — ultimate matter — or 
whether matter for him was a more relative notion: the clay 
is “material” with respect to the statue made out of it, and 
the four elements are “material” with respect to the clay 
that results from a particular mixture of them. And so on, 
but with no completely featureless matter anywhere in the 
analysis. There is controversy over the proper way to inter-
pret Aristotle on this point. The passage I just referred you 
to from De generatione I.4 certainly seems to indicate a 
doctrine of prime matter. In any event, for present purposes 
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we’ll just take Aristotle as having had such a view, since 
that is the way he was interpreted in the Middle Ages. 
So far, we have only a “functional” account of prime matter. We have 
specified a kind of “job description,” and agreed that whatever does that job will 
be called “prime matter.” But we have said nothing at all about what kind of enti-
ty we are going to hire to fill that job. We do not yet know what matter is or what 
it is like. All we know is what it does. 
So let’s look more closely at prime matter. What can we say about it? 
Well, it turns out to be exceedingly strange stuff. 
III.1.ii. Prime matter. 
To see just how strange it is, let’s go back and consider change once again. 
(On this analysis, compare — loosely — Aristotle, Physics I.7–9.) 
Consider two terms ‘A’ and ‘B’ (I’m talking about terms here, pieces of 
language, not other things) that can be truly predicated only of things that exist, of 
beings. That is, they are “existence-entailing” terms. (I impose this restriction on-
ly because I don’t want to be troubled by such “funny” terms as ‘imaginary’, 
‘dead’, etc.) Then consider sentences of the form: 
A has become (or changed into) B. 
Any real change can be expressed in such a form. 
There are two kinds of cases here, depending on the particular choice of 
terms ‘A’ and ‘B’: 
Case (1): ‘A has become B’ can be read as: A was not B, and now 
A is B. For example, ‘The food has become cold’. It wasn’t cold 
before, but now it is. 
If we want to be formal about it, we can express this as: There exists an x 
such that x was A but not B, and now x is A and B. 
In a case like this, the continuous factor that remains throughout the 
change is clear. It’s A (or the x that is ), the food that remains the same food be-
fore and after its becoming cold. Now contrast this with: 
Case (2): ‘A has become B’ cannot be analyzed as before, in Case 
(1). For example, ‘Earth has become fire’ (the substantial change 
among the Aristotelian elements), or ‘The bread has become flesh’ 
(that is, it has been eaten and assimilated — I’m not talking about 
Eucharistic doctrine). 
Here it is not so easy to identify the continuous factor throughout the 
change. It’s not the earth, since in the process of becoming fire it ceases to be 
earth. So too the bread ceases to be bread as it is assimilated and becomes flesh. 
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Now all cases of kind (1) are instances of accidental change. There is an 
underlying individual entity — the A, the food, or the x in our formal version — 
that stays the same throughout the change. 
What about cases of kind (2)? The examples I actually gave of kind (2) 
were both cases of what Aristotle would call substantial change. But not all cases 
of kind (2) are like that. For example, consider: ‘The boy has become the man’, 
‘The vice president has become chairman of the board’. These cases of kind (2) 
change can analyzed, and in a sense “reduced” to kind (1) change by just pushing 
a little deeper: 
There exists a person (Socrates, say) who was a boy and not a 
man, and who is now a man and no longer a boy. 
Likewise in the other example: 
There exists a person (S. Julius Bloodworth-Bigdome, let’s say) 
who was vice president and not chairman of the board, and who is 
now chairman of the board and no longer vice president. 
In cases like this (let ‘C’ be an existence-entailing term like ‘A’ and ‘B’), 
Case 2a: ‘A has become B’ can be read as: There is a C such that C 
was A and not B, and now C is B and not A. 
Plainly, this too is a case of accidental change, since we can identify an 
identically the same existing substrate that endures throughout the change — the 
C. 
III.1.iii. Atomism. 
Now, here’s a question for you: Are all cases of kind (2) change also cases 
of kind (2a) change? If so, then all changes are accidental changes and there is no 
substantial change at all, and Aristotle was misled. 
If that is so, then under pain of infinite regress, whenever we have a 
change, we can always find (if we look deeply enough) an ultimate substrate-
substance — call it Z — that does not change according to kind (2), but if it 
changes at all, changes only according to kind (1). 
That it, if all instances of case (2) are instances of case (2a), then there 
must be ultimate substances such that all change is accidental change in such sub-
stances. There are two forms of such a view. 
(a) You might hold that the same substrate underlies every 
change, that in any change whatever, if you just push the 
analysis hard enough, you always end up at the same place. 
In that case you have the notion of a kind of single sub-
stance — like Plato’s Receptacle, or “matter” in the Platon-
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ic tradition — that underlies all change (as well as underly-
ing all predication). The problem with that view is one we 
have already seen: it would require the same substance to 
have contrary properties at the same time. 
(b) Alternatively, you might say there are several such ultimate 
substances. This view is in effect “atomism.” There are two 
subcases 
(i) You can say these substrates or atoms have no dis-
tinguishing features at all, that they are all just bare 
particulars. There problem here we have likewise 
already seen: the Identity of Indiscernibles. 
(ii) Or you can say these substrates or atoms do have 
features of their own. Then you might say there are 
four — earth, air, fire and water — or you might 
say there are an infinite number of them, as 
Democritus did, or you might say something else 
along these lines. 
On any of these atomistic alternatives, the upshot is the same: all real 
change is accidental change in these ultimate substantial atoms. Generation and 
corruption, in Aristotle’s sense, is just an illusion. All change is to be accounted 
for by the alteration and rearrangement of atoms. 
Now Aristotle and the tradition following him not only reject the Platonic 
alternative — for pretty good reasons (the Law of Non-Contradiction). They also 
reject atomism. Aristotle does this, for instance in the Physics and the De 
generatione et corruptione. Accordingly, the Aristotelians must reject the claim 
that all kind (2) change is also kind (2a) change. In other words, they must say 
there are some cases where A has become B, but where there is no underlying ex-
isting entity that remains identically the same throughout the change. These will 
be the substantial changes. 
On the other hand, we know that every change requires a substrate of some 
kind or other to remain the same, in order to distinguish it from mere succession. 
So here we are. The Aristotelians insist there are genuine substantial 
changes, and these changes require an enduring substrate. But that substrate can-
not be a fully constituted entity that exists in its own right. In short, it doesn’t ex-
ist! And that’s what prime matter is. 
Now what on earth are we going to do about this fine fix? Note the dual 
pressure: 
(1) On the one hand, we cannot say the substrate of substantial 
change doesn’t exist — just like that. Insofar as we are talk-
ing about substantial change, and not just a mere succes-
sion, there is a job for the substrate to do: a unifying job. It 




change. Given the traditional “convertibility” of being and 
unity, therefore, the substrate must exist to the extent that it 
stays the same one thing, and it must do the latter in order 
to do its job. 
(2) On the other hand, we cannot say the substrate does exist 
either, as an entity with its own enduring identity. That 
would make all change accidental change in that substrate, 
and we would be back to either Plato’s Receptacle, or else 
some form of atomism — both of which alternatives the 
Aristotelian tradition rejects. 
So what do we do? 
III.2. Being in potency. 
Well, we could just push the point and 
insist that what we have here is a blatant con-
tradiction, and this shows there simply is no 
substantial change of the kind Aristotle is 
thinking about, so that therefore either Plato 
or the atomists are right. And, as long as 
we’re pushing points, let’s push further: 
Since Plato, as we’ve seen, runs up against 
the Law of Non-Contradiction, this means 
that what we have here is a proof of atomism 
— atomism in the sense that all change is ac-
cidental change in a variety of ultimate sub-
stances. 
But that isn’t what the Aristotelians 
do. They insist on the reality of genuine sub-
stantial change. And so they come up with the exquisitely delicate notion of prime 
matter as a being in potency. 
Here we see the first appearance of the notion of “potentiality,” and the 
distinction between “actuality” and “potentiality” or “potency.” The doctrine is 
extremely important, and also extremely difficult and obscure. 
The fact that the dual pressure — (1) and (2) just above — looks as if it 
leads to an out and out contradiction adds a certain urgency to the important ques-
tion here: Why are the Aristotelians so confident there really are substantial 
changes? In short, what’s wrong with atomism after all? I have some thoughts on 
this, but let’s not develop them here. 
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III.3. Final thoughts on the “Aristotelian” approach. 
The time has come to draw all this to a close. Here is a quick summary of 
the Aristotelian picture we have come up with so far: 
The pin cushion here has both 
(a) internal features of its own, so that we can have several distinguishable 
such pin cushions — “core objects,” substances. Hence no Platonic Recep-
tacle, “Platonic” matter, bare particulars. The substantial form is what is 
responsible for these internal features; 
(b) an internal structure of its own too, made up of prime matter and sub-
stantial form. It is the prime matter that allows each such pin cushion to 
change into a different and new one. 
The composite of these two is the individual substance. (There are also 
“separated” substances that do not have matter. But for now we’re confining our-
selves to material substances.) 
In addition to prime matter and substantial form, other forms can be “ex-
ternally” attached to the substance. Some may be permanently attached, some not. 
But all of them are accidental forms. 
On this picture, the grammatical distinction between subject and predicate 
is not a reliable guide to the ontological structure of a substance. Some predicates 
answer to the internal features of the substance, the substantial form. They are the 
essential predicates; other predicates answer to the accidental features, permanent 
or otherwise. 
Thus predication does not answer to a single kind of ontological relation, 
but to at least two quite different kinds. 
Étienne Gilson, the great patriarch of historians of mediaeval philosophy, 
often distinguished between a so called “logical” approach to reality and a “meta-
physical” approach, and often criticized — even ridiculed — the “logical” ap-
proach. For a long time I couldn’t figure out what he meant. But now I think I 
know. His criticism of the “logicians” doesn’t mean he preferred bad arguments 
to good ones (although there may be other reasons to think that). It means that he 
rejected the “Platonic” view that looks to the facts of predication for a guide to 
reality. (It is perhaps not completely out of place to compare the “Platonic” view 
with the early Wittgenstein’s “picture”-theory of the relation between language 
and the world.) For Aristotelians, Gilson included, there is no such neat relation as 
this. 
IV. A final point of terminology. 
Finally, let me give you a point of terminology. In addition to the meta-
physical notion of accident I have stressed so far, there is also a “logical” usage in 
which accidents are just the things that are contingently predicable of a thing. Ar-
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istotelians as well as Platonists use this notion. This can result in some pretty con-
fusing passages if you’re not careful. This “logical” notion of accident doesn’t 
indicate anything whatever about the metaphysical structure of a thing. It is meta-
physically an entirely neutral usage, compatible with lots of different metaphysi-
cal positions. 
For an example of this usage, see Aquinas, In Boethii De trinitate (= his 
commentary on Boethius’s De trinitate), q. 4, a. 2, obj. 3. The question Aquinas 
raises here is “Whether the variety of accidents makes a diversity according to 
number.” Obj. 5 of the question states, “Moreover, when the cause is removed, so 
is the effect. But every accident can be removed from its subject, ” Don’t worry 
about the rest of the argument; here I’m only trying to illustrate the usage of the 
term ‘accident’. As we know, in the metaphysical sense of ‘accident’, there are 
necessary accidents, so that not every accident can be removed from its subject. 
In Aquinas’s question on Boethius, therefore, it is plainly a different sense of ‘ac-
cident’ that is at stake. 
This “logical” notion of accident is associated with Porphyry, who defines 
it in his Isagoge. For its authentically Aristotelian pedigree, see Topics I.5 102b4–
8 and Metaphysics V.30. In both passages, Aristotle describes both the metaphysi-
cal and the logical senses of ‘accident’. 
The end 
Finitum hoc totum, 
Da mihi potum. 
